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“Do you think you can govern innocently?”  
Jean- Paul Sartre, Dirty Hands 
 
Abstract 
9/11 has shifted the debate about the moral justifiability of torture towards a more 
realist paradigm centered around the question whether we can afford to consider 
morality in the face of an existential threat. The underlying philosophical problem is the 
notion of dirty hands. This paradox has become one of the most important terms of 
reference in the academic debate on the issue of torture (Yemini 2014, 164). However, 
there is no consensus on how to understand the problem. Therefore, the main goal of 
this research is to provide a better understanding of the dilemma. In doing so, it is 
argued that the problem cannot play within either utilitarianism or deontology, but that 
it is still a very real dilemma that occurs within morality. Moreover, a framework based 
on ‘reasons’ will be developed to determine what situations constitute real dilemmas of 
dirty hands, as opposed to other situations of conflict. Finally, it will be shown that it is 
possible, indeed very likely, for a politician to get dirty hands. Four conditions will be 
formulated that determine whether a politician can justify getting his hands dirty.   
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Torture is contrary to every relevant international law, including the law of war (Shue 
2004, 47). Yet within six weeks after September 11, articles began appearing suggesting 
that torture might be required in order to interrogate suspected terrorists about future 
possibilities of violence (Levinson 2004). This thesis is part of the increasingly 
important debate over “the possibility that torture, at least in some carefully specified 
circumstances, might be a ‘lesser evil’ than some other ‘greater evil’ that threatens 
society” (Levinson 2004, 24). Since 9/11 the debate has somewhat shifted from 
questions of the moral justifiability of torture towards a more realist paradigm centered 
around whether we can afford to consider morality in the face of an existential threat 
(Torrente 2015, 4).  
      The underlying philosophical problem is the notion of dirty hands. This notion 
presents a paradox that is as interesting as it is complicated. As Walzer (2004) puts it: 
“the politician must do wrong to do right”. The corresponding puzzle lies in the fact that 
“it is prima facie inconsistent to describe an action as both right and wrong” (Archard 
2013, 778; Tillyris 2015, 64). The two most relevant philosophical theories seem to 
provide strong clarifications. In short, liberals would say that torture “is intrinsically 
wrong and can never be justified” (Yemini 2014, 167), because if an act is morally 
wrong, one should not do it (Moore 1989, 298). In contrast, utilitarians would argue that 
torture can be justified, when it provides the greatest good for the greatest number; in 
that case, one cannot be wrong or guilty (Walzer 2004, 35). Thus, it seems impossible to 
explain this paradox by appealing to liberalism and utilitarianism. “By accepting that 
either the action is not immoral, or that there cannot be a real moral obligation if the 
action is considered immoral” (van Erp 2013, 112), both theories deny the existence of 
the problem. Despite this denial, “the problem of dirty hands has become one of the 
most important terms of reference in contemporary academic scholarship on the issue of 
torture” (Yemini 2014, 163). Therefore, the main aim of this research is to provide a 
better understanding of the problem of dirty hands.  
      In doing so, this thesis will focus on the shortcomings of both liberalism and 
utilitarianism. With these shortcomings in mind, the goal is to offer a better insight and 
an encompassing understanding of the problem of dirty hands. Van Erp (2013) argues 
that “in order to take the problem of dirty hands seriously, it cannot be excluded a priori 
that the responsibility of politicians for the common interest obliges them, under 
exceptional circumstances, to immoral actions”. In his influential essay, Walzer (2004) 
argues “absolutism represents, it seems to me, a refusal to think about what it means for 
the heavens to fall”. Thus, to say that immoral actions are always prohibited expresses a 
kind of moral rigidity that does not acknowledge the reality of exceptional 
circumstances (van Erp 2013, 113; de Wijze 2009, 305). On the other hand, saying that 
the act is not really immoral involves the risk of creating too easily a justification of 
highly extreme and problematic actions (van Erp 2013 112-113; Walzer 2004, 40). In 
order to gain more insight into this tension between moral principles and political 
necessity (van Erp 2013, 110), the main question this research attempts to answer is 
whether, and if so under what circumstances, can politicians get their hands dirty? 
      Politicians acquire dirty hands by deliberately choosing an immoral act for the sake 
of the greater good (de Haan, 2001, 269; Matthews 2006, 3). In a situation of dirty 
hands, the public official “morally ought to do a and morally ought to do b, while he 
cannot do a as well as b” (de Haan 2001, 269). De Haan illustrates that there is “no 
logical incoherence because there is no propositional conflict” (de Haan 2001, 280). The 
problem is rather that “there are two different cherished principles in the premise set, 
the satisfaction of one of which requires the violation of the other. It is a problem of 
incompatibility of values in specific circumstances” (ibid). This results in doing 
something that is immoral no matter the consequences: it is immoral when it fails and it 
is immoral when it succeeds (Matthews 2006, 3). As a consequence, the public official 
with dirty hands is guilty “even though he may have acted rightly in the circumstances” 
(ibid). 
      While there is general consensus on the definition, there is little agreement upon 
how we need to understand the problem of dirty hands in more detail. This question will 
be answered first. Thus, chapter two will provide an overview of the main approaches 
towards the problem, the underlying philosophical debate and will determine where the 
problem occurs. Some scholars, following a more realist line of thought, argue that the 
problem is caused by a clash of morality with some other rational necessity that 
correctly overrules it (Carr 1962), while others argue that it is a dilemma that occurs 
within morality (Nagel 1972; Yemini 2014; Walzer 2004). 
      The third chapter will show that even when scholars agree upon the nature of the 
problem, they can disagree about what circumstances cause a genuine dilemma of dirty 
hands. Thus, in chapter three, this research will answer the question what circumstances 
or conditions, if any, result in a genuine dilemma of dirty hands. Ultimately, a 
framework will be proposed to determine when a situation can be regarded  a true 
dilemma of dirty hands. After all, a politician can only justify getting his hands dirty 
when the dilemma he faces can considered to be a real dilemma of dirty hands. In 
addition, this chapter will address the question how to deal with a dilemma of dirty 
hands. 
      Finally, in the fourth and final chapter, the answer to the research question will be 
formulated and a conclusion will be drawn. Also, there will be reflected upon this study 
and recommendations for future research will be done. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2: How to understand the problem of dirty hands? 
 
The ticking time bomb scenario is a hypothetical situation that is mostly used as an 
example of the problem of dirty hands related to torture. In short, the example describes 
the following: “a political leader has to decide whether he would allow the torture of a 
suspect in order to retrieve information about a ticking bomb that would potentially kill 
hundreds of people” (van Erp 2013, 109). While there are scholars that characterize this 
argument as an ‘intellectual fraud’, it is believed to have great rhetorical power and it 
thus “plays an important role in the broader moral discourse concerning the tension 
between moral principles and political necessity” (van Erp 2013, 110). When reading 
this scenario, one can intuitively apprehend the dilemma a public official might face. 
However, it is argued that the dilemma contains more than ‘just’ that one choice a 
politician is forced to make. This chapter will briefly explore the main approaches 
towards the problem of dirty hands, what the problem of dirty hands actually entails in 
the case of torture, and what the latter means for the structure of the dilemma. Then, the 
main philosophical debate will be critically analyzed. Finally, it will be determined 
whether the problem of dirty hands occurs within outside morality or within morality. 
 
§ 2.1 The dilemma of dirty hands in more detail 
The standard dirty hands thesis, as posed above, suggests that “politics and morality are 
in harmony until a significant paradox of action is presented to the public official” 
(Tillyris 2015, 64). Tillyris, however, argues that conceptualizing the problem of dirty 
hands as ´a momentary dilemma´ does not suffice (Tillyris 2015, 66). In addition, 
Walzer notes that “the dilemma of dirty hands is a central feature of political life that 
arises not merely as an occasional crisis… but systematically and frequently” (Walzer 
1973, 162; Tillyris 2015, 66). Thus, it is argued that the standard display of the problem 
of dirty hands, as posed in the ticking time bomb example, is too “static” and “involves 
much more than a momentary and relatively rare paradox of action” (Tillyris 2015, 64). 
As a result, “the politician’s decision is presented in abstraction from the political 
context within which that decision should be taken” (Tillyris 2015, 66). Moreover, it is 
likely that not only the public official who made the decision – whether to issue torture 
– gets his hands dirty. Matthews (2006) argues that also those who have to carry out the 
orders have to live with the guilt that remains. 
 
2.1.1. A sociological fantasy 
Henry Shue explores a similar though more detailed line of thought in his article about 
making exceptions (2009). He assumes that torture is wrong but that it can, in 
exceptional circumstances, nevertheless be justified (Shue 2012, 312). His main point is 
that the perfect case for torture (in which the act of torture is both rare and successful), 
as presented in most hypothetical situations like the ticking tomb scenario, is a 
sociological fantasy (Shue 2012, 314). He supports this claim by referring to the 
institutional context needed to effectively execute an act of torture. According to Shue, 
“torture takes skill, dispositions, and knowledge that are gained only from experience” 
(Shue 2009, 314; Tillyris 2015, 68). In fact, “if the conscientious offender is to be an 
effective and competent torturer, or to have them on call, he must… be the tip of a 
bureaucratic iceberg of institutionalized torture” (ibid). In other words, it is not realistic 
to have “rare, effective torture because effective torture needs a social institution with a 
bureaucratic life of its own” (Shue 2012, 315). Or, as Tillyris puts it: “torture is a 
practice, not an ad hoc emergency measure” (Tillyris 2015, 66). It is not difficult to see 
that many more people than just the political official who approved the torture would be 
involved in the act and thus also get their hands dirty. But, more importantly, this 
argument alters the structure of the dilemma of dirty hands by suggesting that the 
problem is not merely about “the exhibition of certain vices but also about the 
cultivation of these” (Tillyris 2015, 66). Then, it is not just about one act in a unique 
circumstance anymore, but about a universal set of acts in possible circumstances 
(Matthews 2006, 9). Moreover, by not acknowledging that the problem of dirty hands is 
also about the cultivation of certain vices, Tillyris argues, the static account of the 
dilemma is “oblivious to Machiavelli’s infamous messages” (ibid). What the messages 
of Machiavelli are is explored in the next paragraph. 
 
2.1.2. Interpretations of Machiavelli 
Niccolὸ Machiavelli (1469-1527) first and most clearly illustrated the tension between 
politics and morality (Hampshire 1989, 162). For many, he is the first modern who told 
the truth about politics (Hendrickson 2016, 108). In his era, and even today, 
Machiavellism stands for a doctrine of political success, by means however foul 
(Hendrickson 2016, 105). This makes him known as the political philosopher who 
justified official lying. In fact, in his famous work The Prince he argued that it would be 
irresponsible for ‘a great office of state’ not to be fully prepared at all times to take 
extreme measures of violence or cruelty in order to protect the state when necessary 
(Hampshire 1989, 162). In other words, the state official is not (always) able to practice 
the virtues of a good citizen without compromising the interests of his subjects (Hollis 
1982, 389).  At the same time, however, he should be seen to uphold those virtues: “he 
should get his hands dirty and wear clean gloves” (ibid). In short, “the virtues that bring 
great political achievements and civic glory have their cost in the loss of integrity and of 
fair dealing” (Hampshire 1989, 165). A true Machiavellian will accept those costs. 
      In the course of the centuries, however, the interpretation of Machiavelli’s thought 
has become complicated, and thus the source of many scholarly disputes (Fuller 2016, 
1; Berlin 1977, 25). It is therefore no surprise that The Prince can be interpreted in at 
least one other way. Central in this second interpretation is the assumption that “there 
exists an intractable and perpetual conflict between at least two different moral worlds – 
that of ordinary (Christian) morality and that of politics – each of which corresponds to 
two exhaustive and incompatible practices and ways of life, each with its own ends and 
values” (Tillyris 2015, 64). Acknowledging that there are “different spheres of value 
between which serious and sometimes incommensurable conflicts of value are possible” 
(Parish 2007, 10) would make Machiavelli a value pluralist. Thus, following this line of 
thought, in order to correctly conceptualize the problem of dirty hands requires one to 
conceive political morality as a whole and to view politics as both a practice and a way 
of life (Tillyris 2015, 64). As a result, one should approach political morality on its own 
terms (ibid). 
      The considerations as described above illustrate how the problem of dirty hands can 
(and perhaps should) be interpreted with regard to both the society and the political 
arena we know today. Moreover, thinking about the dilemma of dirty hands as 
something that encompasses more than just one public official who has to make one 
decision proves useful, if not necessary, when answering the questions posed in the next 
sections. In this research, the standard thesis of the problem of dirty hands, as described 
in the ticking time bomb scenario, is used as a starting point. At the same time, it is 
acknowledged that the dilemma is likely to have a much larger scope than is generally 
assumed based on this standard model. Whether the problem of dirty hands fits best 
with the first interpretation of Machiavelli (the ‘teacher of evil’) or with the second 
interpretation (Machiavelli as a pluralist) is determined in the final part of this chapter, 
when it is established whether the problem of dirty hands occurs outside or within 
morality. 
 
§ 2.2 The philosophical debate 
Many of the dilemmas a public official might face (that result in dirty hands) are about 
whether to follow the general (moral) rule or to make an exception (Shue 2012, 308-
309). “Some characterize these ethical challenges as genuine moral dilemmas, while 
others insist that it is not possible for such a thing as a moral dilemma to exist” (Parish 
2007, 3). Thus, the underlying theoretical question is whether there are, or can be, 
genuine moral dilemmas. Both deontologists and utilitarians seem to provide a very 
clear cut answer. They claim that it is not possible, by definition, for a moral dilemma to 
exist (Parish 2007, 4).  
 
2.2.1. Deontology 
Deontology offers the strongest support for the unconditional prohibition of acts that are 
morally wrong, like torture (Matthews 2006, 1). For deontologists, the rightness or 
wrongness of an action depends on “the nature of the act and its conformity to moral 
norms and principles” (Ramsay 2012, 1). In this research, the starting point is the 
Kantian categorical imperative, and in particular the end in itself formulation (Matthews 
2006, 1). Kant provided us with five different formulae of the categorical imperative. In 
this research, the focus will be on the formula of the end in itself: “So act as to use 
humanity, both in your own person and in the person of every other, always at the same 
time as an end, never simply as a means” (Paton 1967, 129). 
      Kant believed that individuals ought to be treated in a way consistent with their 
nature as autonomous persons, i.e. capable of a good will. At the risk of over-
simplification, one might say that the arguments that make up the formula of the end in 
itself all rest on this one principle: “a good will has a unique and absolute value (Paton 
1967, 171). If this is true, it must be morally wrong to subordinate it as a mere means to 
any end of lesser value” (ibid). Thus, this principle rules out treating people merely as a 
means, which is exactly what a torturer would do. 
      In order to gain a better understanding of the relation between principles and ends, 
we first need to consider what is meant by an end. To begin with, an end is an effect 
which the will seeks to produce (Paton 1967, 166). The will of a rational agent is, in 
turn, always directed towards an end he sets for himself (ibid). Furthermore, a rational 
agent sets himself to act in accordance with his conception of the law, that is, in 
accordance with principles (Paton 1967, 167). Thus, according to Kant, there is an 
important connection between ends and principles: our chosen ends are also the ground 
of objective principles (ibid). These principles are important because we know an action 
is “morally worthy not from the purpose that is to be attained by it but from the 
principle by which it is determined” (Parish 2007, 7). 
      Furthermore, Kant is well aware that men are not ‘saints’. “For this reason it may at 
times be necessary to refrain from furthering their ends and even to thwart their wills” 
(Paton 1967, 171). Nevertheless, Kant strongly believes that “a good will is present in 
every man, however much it may be overlaid by selfishness, and however little it may 
be manifested in action. Because of this he is still entitled to respect and is not to be 
treated as a mere instrument or a mere thing. As a being capable of moral action, a man, 
however degraded, has still an infinite potential value; and his freedom to work out his 
own salvation in his own way must not be restricted” (Paton 1967, 171). Thus, no 
amount of social benefit can justify overstepping the bounds of our principles and 
integrity (Parish 2007, 7). 
      In short, deontologists stress the absolute worth, dignity and freedom of the 
autonomous individual and his will. The principle that is central to this believe rules out 
treating people merely as a means and because (state) torture requires the torturer “to 
break the will of an individual through the infliction of intense physical and 
psychological suffering, it is a direct attack on the most fundamental value of 
deontological theory” (Matthews 2006, 1). The deontological response to the problem 
of dirty hands is thus, put simply, that moral actors must never get their hands dirty 
(Parish 2007, 7). 
 
2.2.2. Utilitarianism 
It is argued that considerations of utility have a different, more special, moral 
importance to the choices of political actors (Parish 2007, 6). Intuitively, the theory 
seems to work best when addressing questions of public policy with a broad impact 
(ibid). A typical utilitarian response to the problem of dirty hands would be to accept 
that certain apparent evils must be done in order to achieve maximum social utility 
(Parish 2007, 5).  
      Utility, or the ‘Greatest Happiness Principle’ holds that “actions are right in 
proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse 
of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure and the absence of pain; by 
unhappiness, pain and privation of pleasure” (Mill 1879, 9; West 2006, 68). Thus, an 
action or a policy will be deemed right if it contributes to the greatest happiness of the 
greatest number (Wiggins 2006, 144). But, Mill argues, the suggestion that happiness is 
the end and aim of morality does not mean that people do not need guidance and advice 
when trying to achieve that goal ‘the right way’ (Mill 1879, 26).  
This becomes even more important when analyzing one of the main critiques of the 
theory, which proves useful for understanding utilitarianism in a way relevant for this 
research. Because of this central notion of happiness and (social) utility, the doctrine is 
often called immoral by linking it to the concept of expediency (Mill 1879, 24). The 
most well-known implementation of expediency is opportunistic in character: “for the 
purpose of getting over some momentary embarrassment, or attaining some object 
immediately useful to ourselves or others, to tell a lie” (ibid). Thus, in this case, a 
politician would be guided by (individual) advantages rather than moral principles. 
According to Mill, inasmuch as any deviation from the truth weakens the 
trustworthiness of human assertion, the theory of utilitarianism holds that when 
someone, for the sake of convenience to himself or some other individual, rather than 
for the sake of the greater good, tells a lie is much more than expedient, he then “acts 
the part of one of the worst enemies” (Mill 1879, 24-25). 
      Yet, Mill argues, that even this rule permits possible exceptions is acknowledged by 
all moralists (Mill 1879, 25). For utilitarians, this would especially be the case when the 
withholding of information would preserve someone from some form of unmerited evil 
(ibid). Key is to make sure that the exception does not go beyond the need, and that it 
has the least possible effect on reliability and truthfulness, by both recognizing it and, if 
possible, by defining its limits (Mill 1879, 25). Here, Mill makes the case for 
utilitarianism: “if the principle of utility is good for anything, it must be good for 
weighing these conflicting utilities against one another, and marking out the region 
within which one or the other preponderates” (Mill 1879, 25). 
      Furthermore, Mill acknowledges that it is because of the complicated nature of 
human affairs that it is impossible to frame rules of conduct without any exceptions 
(Mill 1879, 27). In other words, a public official must be able to take particularities of 
specific circumstances into account. This can be challenging, and often results in 
conflicting obligations, which is the real difficulty. But, if utility is the ultimate source 
of moral obligations, utility may be invoked to decide between them when their 
demands are incompatible (Mill 1879, 27).  
      To summarize: it is important to keep in mind that the utilitarian standard is not the 
agent’s own greatest happiness but the greatest amount of happiness altogether (West 
2006, 71). Thus, an exception can be made or a lie can be told only when it is in the 
interest of the general amount of happiness, when it is done in the interest of an 
individual it is wrong. In Utilitarianism, Mill argues that “ultimately, our notions of 
justice and moral rightness are grounded in social utility alone. It is the criterion of 
utility that gives us our only touchstone for deciding which of several considerations has 
priority in an instance of apparent conflict” (Parish 2007, 5). Thus, for a utilitarian, 
though a situation may sometimes feel like a moral dilemma, there cannot be such a 
thing as a moral dilemma properly understood. Because good consequences constitute 
the sum and substance of the moral universe, there simply cannot, if the consequences 
are good enough, be any moral residue left to clean up (ibid).  
 
§ 2.3 Where does the problem occur? 
It has become clear that neither a pure utilitarian, nor a pure deontologist can suffer 
from dirty hands. After all, they cannot be both morally right and morally wrong at the 
same time, a condition that is necessary for hands to become dirty (Yemini 2014, 167). 
Thus, as Nielsen (2007) and Yemini (2014) argued, for neither pure utilitarians nor pure 
deontologists does the problem of dirty hands constitute a real moral dilemma; in fact, it 
is not even a real problem to begin with. However, neither response seems satisfying; 
“neither response seems fully capable of accounting for powerful intuitive claims 
invoked by the rival point of view” (Parish 2007, 9). In fact, van Erp argues that by 
giving these solutions, both theories do not take the problem of dirty hands seriously 
enough (2013, 112). Therefore, the next paragraph will challenge both deontology and 
utilitarianism in relation to their answers to the problem of dirty hands.  
 
2.3.1. Towards value pluralism 
Critics have rejected both deontology and utilitarianism as theories that provide final 
and universally persuasive answers to these kind of moral questions (Parish 2007, 9-10). 
Instead, they argue that there are various value spheres in the world and that these stand 
in irreconcilable tension to one another (Weber 1946, 147). Moreover, according to 
Weber, “values bear some relation to one another but they cannot be cashed out into a 
single common currency of evaluation, as Mill had believed was true of utility, nor can 
any such standard be given comprehensive priority over rival claims, as Kant had 
thought true of the superior standard of duty” (Parish 2007, 10). 
      This perspective has direct consequences for the tension between deontology and 
utilitarianism on the one hand and the problem of dirty hands on the other hand. As seen 
before, the dirty hands thesis assumes the existence of a paradox of action whereby an 
innocent course of action is unachievable (Tillyris 2015, 62). This assumption poses na 
obvious challenge to the vision shared by both deontology and utilitarianism: “the belief 
that, at least in theory, values form a harmonious whole and moral conflicts are 
perfectly resolvable” (Tillyris 2015, 62). Thus, “the dirty hands thesis suggests that the 
Kantian and Utilitarian vision of harmony and innocence is unsatisfactorily idealistic: 
its value monism misrepresents our fragmented morality and, in particular, the messy 
realities of politics” (Tillyris 2015, 62; Walzer 1980, 229). Or, to use the words of 
Stephen de Wijze (2009), “a dirty hands analysis provides, at least in political 
philosophy, a more plausible characterization of our moral reality”. Not only does he 
argue that there do exist genuine moral dilemmas, he also states that conflicting 
personal and role-based moral claims give rise to moral conflicts in which “those who 
strive to act morally unavoidably get dirty hands” (de Wijze 2009, 309). In short, it can 
be argued that “the general insight of the dirty hands thesis better captures the 
fragmented nature of morality and the complexity of politics than the Kantian and 
Utilitarian vision of harmony and innocence” (Tillyris 2015, 63). Or, as van Erp puts it, 
“the ambiguity that politics is confronted with is in its sharpest form formulated in the 
notion of a duty to act immorally” (van Erp 2013, 112). 
      When accepting that politics and morality are difficult to harmonize (Tillyris 2015, 
61), and that this can lead to dilemmas of dirty hands, there is still one question 
remaining: where do these dilemmas occur? By challenging both deontology and 
utilitarianism, it has been showed that the dilemma of dirty hands can occur within 
morality, as some scholars believe it does. Others believe that the dilemma occurs 
outside morality, when morality clashes with some form of rational necessity that 
correctly overrules it. Here, a distinction is made between operating above morality and 
operating with a different morality.  
 
2.3.2. Outside morality 
As said before, Machiavelli first and most clearly recognized that politics and morality 
are difficult to harmonize (Tillyris 2015, 63). Or, as Hampshire (1989) and van Erp 
(2013) put it: there is an evident incompatibility between strict attention to justice and 
fairness on the one side and effectiveness in the exercise of political power on the other 
side. In line with the first interpretation, Machiavelli as a ‘teacher of evil’, it is argued 
that “a successful political leader is always rather loose in his thinking, flexible, not 
bound by principles or by theories” (Hampshire 1989, 163). His famous lesson ‘learning 
how not to be good’ suggests that ‘reasons of state’ can be regarded as more important 
than morality (Hampshire 1989, 162). Or, in other words, “in times of political 
necessity, means must be adapted to circumstances” (Ramsay 2012, 2). Thus, if we 
allow that non-moral ‘oughts’ can sometimes trump moral ones, then the problem of 
dirty hands may be re-formulated as holding that, in certain specific circumstances, 
practicality wins out over morality (Duquette 2007, 52). So, this view holds that 
morality is not the only legitimate determinant of right action. Rather, it is argued that at 
times and in certain situations, morality is successfully challenged by what can be called 
necessity. This is similar to the way political realists challenge morality within politics. 
They argue that “political necessity is a form of external coercion or urgency and, 
therefore, different from moral necessity” (van Erp 2013, 110). 
      This realist interpretation of the dilemma of dirty hands stresses the amoral, instead 
of immoral, character of the doctrine. “It locates political activity in an autonomous 
realm, free from the constraints and limitations of moral judgments” (Ramsay 2012, 3). 
This way, political decisions are made based on rational thoughts regarding the interest 
of the state. In short, it implies that moral considerations, impulses and principles have 
no place in politics (ibid). Thus, in this case, the dilemma of dirty hands constitutes a 
clash between rational practicality on the one hand and morality on the other hand. 
 
2.3.3. Within morality 
However, the second interpretation of Machiavelli (that stresses the pluralist character 
of the tension between politics and morality) indicates that he believed that “the 
incongruence between politics and morality involves an incompatibility of values and 
character” (Tillyris 2015, 71). Or, as Yemini (2014) puts it, the fact that the problem of 
dirty hands does not exist within both utilitarianism and deontology does not make it 
non-existent. On the contrary, he argues that the problem of dirty hands is “a very real 
dilemma within morality” based on Nagel’s statement that individuals are inclined “to 
hold some version of a mixed morality”, that is, views from different theories; and “do 
not treat a moral intuition as if it were a closed and exclusive moral system”, that is, 
without any flexibility (Yemini 2014, 168; Nagel 1972, 124-125). This means that, 
within this view, it is generally assumed that people hold simultaneously utilitarian and 
deontologist points of view: “the mere concept of dirty hands inherently assumes, and 
requires, the moral agent to hold mixed absolutist-consequentialist moral intuitions 
pulling in opposite directions” (Yemini 2014, 164). The situations that give rise to such 
a dilemma, as torture does, are those in which the utilitarian and the absolutist 
perspectives demand contradicting courses of action (Nagel 1972, 142-143; Yemini 
2014, 164). 
      In ‘Arguing about War’ Walzer links this idea to a more specific situation of 
emergency: “the doctrine of supreme emergency is a way of maneuvering between two 
very different and characteristically opposed understandings of morality… Both these 
moral understandings have claims upon us, and yet they pull us in different directions… 
Neither is strong enough to defeat the other; neither is so weak that we can disregard it. 
At the risk of philosophical muddle: we must negotiate the middle ground” (Walzer 
2004, 35-36). In this essay, Walzer understands the problem of dirty hands as a conflict 
between utilitarianism and absolutism (Yemini 2014, 166). 
 
2.3.4. Towards an answer 
In this research, the problem of dirty hands is believed to occur within morality. The 
basic assumption that underlies this believe is formulated by Walzer: “there are no 
moments in human history that are not governed by moral rules; the human world is a 
world of limitation, and moral limits are never suspended… But there are moments 
when the rules can be and perhaps have to be overridden. They have to be overridden 
precisely because they have been suspended. And overriding the rules leaves guilt 
behind, as a recognition of the enormity of what we have done” (Walzer 2004, 34). 
      In addition, de Wijze (2009) and Matthews (2006) argue that the dilemma of dirty 
hands is difficult specifically for the moral person, not for the immoral or amoral 
person. “Dirty hands will arise only when a good person, through unfortunate 
circumstances, is compelled to deliberately and knowingly choosing to act in an evil 
manner for the sake of some greater good”. Thus, a public official facing such a 
dilemma has to make a conscientious decision. It seems logical to question the 
possibility of making such a decision when assuming all the characteristics of the 
dilemma are amoral because it occurs outside morality. As van Erp puts it: “one must 
doubt whether a politician who does not feel the tragic and considers himself only the 
legitimized public servant of the raison d’état could have come to a conscientious 
decision (van Erp 2013, 116). 
      Moreover, van Erp emphasizes the above by arguing that “if political leaders, for 
reasons of political necessity, must commit actions that would be criminal under normal 
circumstances, then such actions must also be acceptable for the moral judgments of 
others” (van Erp 2013, 111). Indeed, “the fact that many people avoid becoming 
responsible for such actions does not mean that these actions are exempt from moral 
evaluation on the basis of universal principles” (ibid). Moreover, according to Hollis 
(1982), the fact that there is a special code of conduct for state officials, which is based 
on their duties of office, does not lead to a complete lack of morality. In fact, even 
though the theory of utilitarianism (with its focus on consequences) is intuitively a 
better match with those duties of office, the fact that politicians are inclined to be 
concerned about consequences does not imply anything about a lack of principle (Hollis 
1982, 388). 
      Finally, van Erp (2013) argues that the concept of political necessity (which is 
central in the amoral perspective of the dilemma) is itself often “used within the strategy 
of the political power game”. When political necessity allows for the making of an 
exception, and in doing so for the transgression of both legal and moral rules, this 
decision must be based on a moral judgment (van Erp 2013, 117). “Things become very 
unclear”, and possibly subjective, “when this judgment is not considered to be based on 
moral principles but on political values” (ibid). 
      In short, one of the basic characteristics of the dilemma of dirty hands (a moral 
person is forced to make a difficult, conscientious decision) seems to rule out a 
completely amoral structure of the problem. After all, advocates of the amoral 
perspective argue that moral considerations, impulses and principles have no place in 
political decision-making. Moreover, the realist argument that political necessity is (or 
should be) a sufficient reason to evaluate the doctrine as amoral is not convincing. 
Rather, it is argued that political necessity can, in some circumstances, override moral 
rules. When this happens, politicians use a different morality, which gives the problem 
of dirty hands a pluralistic character instead of an amoral one.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3: What circumstances or conditions can justify getting dirty hands? 
 
Now that the nature of the problem and the context in which it occurs have been 
determined, this chapter will focus on what circumstances or conditions, if any, provide 
a justification for politicians to get dirty hands. In doing so, this chapter will provide a 
framework for what constitutes a genuine dilemma of dirty hands. After all, a politician 
can only justify getting his hands dirty when the dilemma he faces can be seen as a real 
dilemma of dirty hands, instead of any other situation of conflict. It will become clear 
that even when scholars agree that the dilemma occurs within morality, they can have a 
significant different opinion on what situations constitute genuine dilemmas of dirty 
hands. Since an amoral structure of the problem has been ruled out, the first question 
that will be briefly addressed is what can reasonably be demanded of those who incur 
the responsibility of political power?  
      According to Hampshire, politicians should: 1) “recognize the weight of their 
peculiar responsibility in disposing of the lives of others; 2) be clear-headed, and not 
divided in mind, about their obligations to protect the reasonable interests of their 
innocent fellow citizens; and 3) at all times be prepared for the occurrence of an 
uncontrolled conflict of duties in situations which seem to exclude the possibility of a 
decent outcome, and in which all lines of action seem dishonorable or blameworthy” 
(Hampshire 1989, 170). Particularly the last point refers most obviously to the problem 
of dirty hands or, as Hampshire formulates it, the contrast between innocence and 
experience. According to Walzer, citizens expect their leaders to be goal-oriented; they 
are judged more on the basis of the goals they reach than by the rules they uphold 
(Walzer 2004, 38). It was already clear that it is possible, indeed very likely, for a 
politician to face a dilemma of dirty hands. But, citizens can also reasonably expect 
them to be able to deal with such a dilemma. Now, there is one important questions 
remaining: when is a situation a true dilemma of dirty hands?  
 
§ 3.1 Dirty hands versus other situations of conflict 
Even though there is no real consensus on this question, it is clear that not all motives 
for overriding moral rules seem to be valid. In the following section, the main 
contradicting perspectives that provide a framework for determining whether a situation 
constitutes a real dilemma of dirty hands will be set out. The focus will be on the 
conditions provided by  Yemini (2014), Nagel (1986) and Walzer (2004). 
 
3.1.1. Reasons 
Yemini (2014) has, based on Nagel’s (1986) argument, formulated an approach to 
determine whether a situation is a genuine conflict of dirty hands. Both Yemini and 
Nagel argue that the ticking time-bomb scenario is an example of a real dilemma of 
dirty hands. Central in their reasoning is the premise that “the moral worth of an action 
is primarily determined by the intentions of its agent” (van Erp 2013, 110). Nagel 
(1986) relates this premise to the concept of reasons, which illustrates the source of the 
difference between a genuine dilemma of dirty hands and other situations of conflict 
(Yemini 2014, 170). More specifically, Nagel makes an important distinction between 
different types of reasons. He argues that reasons can differ in an important way by their 
relativity to the agent, the person for whom they are reasons (Nagel 1986, 153). This 
results in two main types of reasons 1) agent-neutral reasons and 2) agent-relative 
reasons (Nagel 1986, 152-153). If a reason does not include an essential reference to the 
person who has it, it is an agent neutral reason, while if a reason does include an 
essential reference to the person who has it, it is an agent-relative reason (ibid). While 
the neutral element is utilitarian in nature because it is concerned with what should 
happen, with some degree of objective utility that everyone has reason to promote; the 
relative element is concerned with what people should or may do, which is independent 
of the outcome of their actions (Nagel 1986, 165; Yemini 2014, 168). Thus, when the 
reason is agent-neutral, anyone has reason (or interest) to want it to happen. When a 
reason is relative, we tend to think that someone has more specific (individual) reasons 
or interest to want it to happen (ibid). 
      Another assumption of their argument is that ethics is concerned with a) what 
should happen and b) with what people should or may do (Yemini 2014, 170). As 
shown above, neutral reasons underlie the former, while relative reasons can affect the 
latter (Nagel 1986, 165). In philosophical discussion, the predominant neutral 
component can be challenged by two different types of reasons that are relative in form: 
1) reasons of autonomy and 2) reasons of deontology (ibid). Autonomous reasons (not 
to be confused with autonomy of the free will) stem from “the desires, projects, 
commitments, and personal ties of the individual agent, all of which give him reasons to 
act in the pursuit of ends that are his own”, as opposed to ends that are neutral (Nagel 
1986, 165; Yemini 2014, 170). With deontological reasons Nagel does not mean 
“neutral reasons for everyone to bring it about that no one is maltreated” but rather 
“relative reasons for each individual not to maltreat others himself in his dealings with 
them” (ibid). In practice, these reasons often interact with each other. Intuitively, we all 
should live our own life (autonomy), have some concern for the general good (neutral 
values) and treat the people we deal with decently (deontology) (Nagel 1986, 166). But, 
sometimes, these different components of morality clash by demanding different 
courses of action, resulting in serious inner conflict (ibid).  
      According to Yemini (2014), one specific type of inner conflict, one between neutral 
reasons and deontological reasons, causes a dilemma of dirty hands. To be clear, the 
difference between those is that “deontological reasons have their full force against you 
doing something – not just against its happening” (Nagel 1986, 177). Moreover, 
deontological principles are usually treated as mandatory, without exceptions (Nagel 
1986, 178). When weighing deontological reasons over autonomous ones (Yemini 
2014, 169), for example, this feels intuitively right. But in the situation of dirty hands, 
“deontological principles suddenly face an unusual matching opponent from within 
morality in the figure of neutral reasons of sufficient strength” (Yemini 2014, 171; 
Nagel 1986, 176). Thus, such a conflict is between what is, in general and for everyone, 
desirable to happen and what you as an individual should or may do. Or, in other words, 
it is a conflict between “reasons rooted in concerns for what we are doing to people and 
reasons rooted in concerns for what will happen” (Lund 2011, 676). If one chooses for 
the general good, it means overriding a moral rule (and thus hurting someone at the 
expense of one’s own moral conscious), whereas if one chooses to not hurt someone 
and as a result he gets to keep his individual moral status intact it goes at the expense of 
the general good. This can be regarded as a unique kind of conflict because it is likely to 
be much more difficult, if at all possible, to resolve (Yemini 2014, 170-171).  
      Thus, according to Yemini (2014), only a conflict between neutral and deontological 
reasons can cause a dilemma of dirty hands. Thus, the question whether to torture 
someone in the case of a real threat can be regarded as a true dilemma of dirty hands: an 
acute conflict between neutral, utilitarian reasons (preventing the death of many 
innocent civilians) and deontological restrictions (the torturing of the rebel/terrorist). 
Without these distinctions between reasons, it is problematic to separate a problem of 
dirty hands from other situations of conflict (Yemini 2014, 171). 
 
3.1.2. Supreme emergency 
However, another very influential approach to what circumstances or conditions 
constitute a true dilemma of dirty hands excludes precisely this situation from the 
possibilities. With his supreme-emergency argument, Walzer attempts to “provide an 
account of when it is permissible (or necessary) to get our hands dirty” (Walzer 2004, 
46). According to Walzer (2004), dirty hands are “not permissible (or necessary) when 
anything less than the ongoingness of the community is at stake, or when the danger we 
face is anything less than communal death” (ibid). This way, Walzer offers a very clear 
but also a quite narrow construction of the problem.  
According to Walzer, a supreme emergency exists when “our deepest values and our 
collective survival are in imminent danger”, when a threat is both close and serious 
(Walzer 2004, 33). Here, the question whether we can afford morality in the face of an 
existential threat, as posed in the introduction of this research, is perhaps most clearly 
illustrated. Shue argues that because of what is at stake or, in other words, what is going 
to be lost if certain action is not taken, one “ought to take a kind of action that one 
would not ordinarily take: one ought to make an exception because this is, in effect, an 
emergency” (Shue 2009, 310). In the case of torture, the exception would be to a 
prohibition: one ought to do what is normally prohibited (ibid). Walzer argues that there 
is no great precision required in calculating whether something is such an emergency: 
“we can only be overwhelmed by supreme emergency” (Walzer 2004, 40). 
      So what exactly is the difference between a supreme emergency and a ‘daily’ 
(military) emergency? Walzer shows that as far as individuals are concerned, supreme 
emergency does not justify a radical exception to rights normality (Walzer 2004, 41). In 
fact, a true moral person will accept risk (and sometimes even death) rather than kill the 
innocent (ibid). But a moral political leader of a country will not accept the risk, let 
alone the fact of communal death; why not? The answer to this question relies on two 
theories that need each other to be persuasive: the theory of representation and the value 
of community. In short, the theory of representation argues that “one can, morally and 
psychologically, accept risks for himself, but not for others” (Walzer 2004, 41). In fact, 
Walzer argues that the first major task of political leaders is risk avoidance or risk 
reduction, “that is what governments are for” (Walzer 2004, 42). Thus, “no government 
can put the life of the community itself and of all its members at risk, so long as there 
are actions available to it, even immoral actions, that would avoid or reduce that risk” 
(ibid). In doing so, the government does not only represent individuals but also a 
collective entity (religious, political, or cultural) from which individuals derive some 
portion of their identity (Walzer 2004, 43). Here, Walzer distinguishes the community 
from the state (Yemini 2014, 161). Only when the community is threatened, by facing 
moral as well as physical extinction or the end of a way of life, it may be allowed to 
override the moral rules that are normally to be respected (Walzer 2004, 44).  
      To summarize: there are different ways to determine what situations constitute true 
dilemmas of dirty hands. According to both Yemini and Nagel, a distinction between 
reasons, relative to the agent, is needed to separate a problem of dirty hands from other 
situations of conflict. Walzer argues that only a supreme emergency, when a community 
faces such a threat that the ‘ongoingness’ of a certain way of life is at risk, can justify 
getting dirty hands.  
 
3.1.3. Towards an answer 
It has become clear that examples of emergencies and exceptions dominate the 
literature, suggesting that dirty hands have no place in more ordinary cases. While 
Walzer’s supreme emergency doctrine and the ‘reasons’ argument as formulated by 
Yemini and Nagel share a certain basic starting point – they both accept that “politics is 
conflicted and morally messy” (Lund 2011, 676) and they both believe that the problem 
of dirty hands is a conflict between utilitarianism and absolutism (Yemini 2014, 168) – 
they fundamentally disagree on the framework that determines whether a situation is a 
true dilemma of dirty hands. Walzer believes that actions of terrorists cannot be an 
urgent threat to the survival of a community and, more specifically, he supports the 
claim that “current terrorism is far from constituting a supreme emergency for Western 
democracies” (van Erp 2013, 118; Lund 2011, 677). Thus, according to Walzer, the 
ticking time-bomb scenario cannot be seen as a true dilemma of dirty hands. Yemini, on 
the other hand, does believe that this hypothetical example is a real dilemma of dirty 
hands based on the argument that it is an illustration of a conflict between neutral and 
deontological reasons. This section will show why Yemini and Nagel provided a better 
framework to determine whether a situation is a genuine dilemma of dirty hands. 
      Most importantly, it can be argued that Yemini and Nagel have succeeded better in 
capturing the general paradox that is central to the problem of dirty hands. To freshen 
our memory, the dilemma occurs within morality, has a pluralistic character and both 
absolutist and utilitarian moral intuitions are pulling in opposite directions. Important 
characteristics include the fact that any possible course of action is both right and wrong 
and that the politician faced with the dilemma is forced to make a choice. As the next 
paragraphs will show, it is possible to interpret Walzer’s supreme emergency doctrine 
(hereafter SED) in ways that do not do justice to the way the problem of dirty hands 
should be understood. 
      First, the moral paradox (or arguably lack thereof) that underlies Walzer’s SED, 
similar to the way it underlies the problem of dirty hands in general, is critically 
analyzed. Walzer seems to suggest that SED provides a moral ‘loop-hole’ for states to 
override moral rules for the sake of the greater good, i.e. the survival of a community 
(Walzer 2004, 44). Brian Orend notices that this makes SED strikingly similar to one 
form of rule-utilitarianism: “during ordinary conditions of war, we are to adhere 
absolutely to the rules of jus in bello. However, when confronted with the hardest case, 
we are to set aside these rules and do what we must to prevail” (Orend 2001, 25). 
Moreover, by focusing on the community (instead of focusing on individuals), SED 
seems to suggest that “individual human rights are not as fundamental for Walzer as 
shared ways of life are” (Orend 2001, 26). Essentially, Orend argues that the way 
Walzer refers to (or the extent to which he uses) utilitarianism within SED does not fit 
with his reference to the general paradox of dirty hands. After all, utilitarianism is 
designed to avoid precisely this kind of dilemma by offering a coherent ranking of all 
the options based on the concept of (social) utility (Orend 2001, 28).  
      Second, Walzer suggests that a public official does not really have a choice when a 
threat is both imminent and close. Walzer implies that a political leader would have to 
choose for the survival of his own community (Walzer 2004, 42-45; Orend 2001, 28-
29). He would have to get his hands dirty by ‘killing the innocent’. This means that in 
the rare case of a genuine supreme emergency, the public official is not truly confronted 
with a choice. Rather, he is confronted with the need to act immorally. I argue that 
while this acknowledges one aspect of the paradox (all options are immoral), it neglects 
another: key is the fact that a politician is forced to make a choice and  this choice is 
based on mixed absolutist-consequentialist moral intuitions pulling in opposite 
directions (Yemini 2014, 164) .  
      Moreover, van Erp (2013) argues that “the idea that we could be obliged to commit 
a crime contradicts the conception of moral necessity”. Therefore, the focus should be 
on the question how necessary an action can be (van Erp 2013, 116). A political 
necessity is truly necessary only when it is a result of coercive reasons for action. And 
even then, it is a kind of necessity that leaves room for “practical freedom and 
decisions, for the possibility not to act or to do something else” (van Erp 116-117). 
      Finally, van Erp argues that when assuming that the conscientious politician must 
accept that necessity can sometimes override moral rules, there is no moral (or legal) 
law that explains (in detail) when a situation is one of extreme emergency (van Erp 
2013, 118). For example, questions of imminence cannot be precisely quantified or 
decided on with complete certainty (Lund 2011, 657) and Walzer himself states that 
“there is no great precision required in calculating whether something is such an 
emergency: we can only be overwhelmed by supreme emergency” (Walzer 2004, 40). 
Therefore, Lund (2011) argues that SED needs further clarification in order to reduce 
the likelihood that it will be manipulated. 
      While this focus on the dilemma could be explained by the fact that Walzer, with his 
formulation of SED, attempts to provide a way out, SED is too narrow for determining 
all possible dirty hands scenarios. SED may very well be a problem of dirty hands, but 
there are more genuine situations of dirty hands imaginable. To illustrate, Walzer treats 
a situation of supreme emergency as if it is substantively unique (Yemini 2014, 172-
173). I would like to argue that the difference between SED and the ticking time-bomb 
example is a matter of degree (Yemini 2014, 171), not of kind. While the risk of 
hundreds of civilians dying because of a bomb explosion is obviously a less severe 
threat than the risk of losing the ‘ongoingness’ of an entire community, the core of the 
dilemma is the exact same. It is a conflict between agent neutral considerations and 
deontological restrictions; it is about the choice to either prevent something horrible that 
is about to happen by overriding a moral rule, or to comply with the moral rules and 
therefore be unable to prevent the horrible thing that is about to happen. Even 
supporters of Walzer’s SED recognize that the core of the problem is a conflict between 
“reasons rooted in concerns for what we are doing to people and reasons rooted in 
concerns for what will happen” (Lund 2011, 676). This is literally how Yemini (based 
on Nagel) defined the framework for determining whether situations are true dilemmas 
of dirty hands. Walzer has, with SED, formulated a very specific type of neutral 
considerations (Yemini 2014, 172) which is on its own too narrow to capture all 
possible scenarios of the conflict. 
      In short, the framework based on reasons as formulated by Yemini and Nagel better 
captures all the characteristics central to the paradox of dirty hands. In doing so, it 
provides the most convincing way to determine whether a situation is a true dilemma of 
dirty hands. Moreover, the difference between Walzer’s doctrine of supreme emergency 
and the ticking time-bomb example is a matter of degree (Yemini 2014, 171), not of 
kind. This means that, while the doctrine of supreme emergency is a dilemma of dirty 
hands, it is on its own too narrow to account for all possible scenarios of the conflict. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 3.2 Conditions and guidelines: permitted immorality 
Now that it is determined when a situation is a true dilemma of dirty hands, it is 
possible to develop more practical conditions that identify when it is justified for 
politicians to get their hands dirty. Stephen de Wijze (2009) provides a concise list of 
conditions under which moral violations can be permissible. “All conditions must be 
met, or the action moves from being a justified moral violation to one that exceeds the 
boundaries of ‘permitted immorality’; that is, the conditions are jointly sufficient and 
severally necessary” (de Wijze 2009, 310). According to de Wijze, it is justified for 
politicians to get their hands dirty when: 
 
1. The chosen action is the result of an unavoidable moral dilemma and when it 
concerns the overriding of an important value or principle; 
2. The public official is motivated by moral considerations when committing the 
moral violation; 
3. The action is chosen in order to bring about the lesser evil and when this action 
was made necessary by either immoral or evil (external) individuals or 
organizations; 
4. It can be reasonably expected that the chosen action succeeds in bringing about 
the lesser evil and when this same action is proportional to the harm it will either 
reduce or prevent (de Wijze 2009, 310). 
 
These conditions are clearly linked to both the general characteristics of the dilemma of 
dirty hands and the framework provided by Yemini and Nagel. Particularly the first and 
second conditions illustrate one of the key arguments in favor of the dilemma occurring 
within morality, and of the pluralistic character of the dilemma, by emphasizing that 
there are moral costs involved and by implying that dirty hands cannot be justified when 
purely pragmatic reasons for actions are given. Instead, public officials are forced to act 
within a “complex of immorality” (de Wijze 2009, 310). Conditions three and four, that 
stress the need for the lesser evil (which would intuitively be overriding the 
deontological side of the dilemma), are also obviously linked to the problem of dirty 
hands and its characteristics but are arguably slightly more difficult to live up to. After 
all, an important aspect of the dilemma is the fact that the moral agent has “mixed 
absolutist-consequentialist moral intuitions that pull in opposite directions” (Yemini 
2014, 164). In addition, as argued before, while utilitarianism might be a better match 
with the duties of office, the fact that politicians are inclined to be concerned about 
consequences does not imply anything about a lack of principle (Hollis 1982, 388). 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4: Conclusion 
 
In this research, I have argued that the problem of dirty hands cannot play within either 
utilitarianism or deontology. Still, it is a very real dilemma that occurs within morality 
by confronting a politician with the seemingly unresolvable conflict between moral 
intuitions pulling in opposite directions (Yemini 2014, 177). I have also shown what 
situations are real dilemmas of dirty hands. While obviously not every situation of 
conflict can be regarded as such a dilemma, it has been argued that some may be 
wrongly excluded from this category. Surprisingly, the very influential framework of 
supreme emergency formulated by Walzer (2004) does not always do justice to the way 
the problem should be understood. Instead, the perspective that is based on reasons, as 
formulated by Yemini and Nagel, captures the paradox and its characteristics best. This 
does not mean that a public official is not faced with a dilemma of dirty hands in the 
rare case of a supreme emergency. Rather, it is argued that supreme emergency is a 
dilemma of dirty hands, but that it is too narrow to account for all possible scenarios of 
such a conflict. This reasoning is supported by the claim that the difference between 
supreme emergency on the one hand and the ticking time-bomb scenario on the other 
hand is a matter of degree, not of kind. 
      It is possible, indeed very likely, for a politician to acquire dirty hands in his career. 
But, he can only justify getting his hands dirty when he faces an acute conflict between 
neutral, utilitarian reasons and deontological restrictions. Such a dilemma is between 
what is, in general and for everyone, desirable to happen and what you as an individual 
should or may do. It is a conflict between “reasons rooted in concerns for what we are 
doing to people and reasons rooted in concerns for what will happen” (Lund 2011, 676). 
      This perspective leads to a framework with more practical conditions. A politician 
can justifiably get his hands dirty when: 1) the chosen action is the result of an 
unavoidable moral dilemma, 2) he is motivated by moral considerations, 3) the action is 
chosen to bring about the lesser evil, and 4) it can be reasonably expected that the 
chosen action succeeds in bringing about the lesser evil (de Wijze 2009, 310). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Recommendations 
This research has made some important claims about the controversy of the notion of 
dirty hands. Since 9/11 both the philosophical and societal debate about torture has 
changed, which makes a renewed and up-to-date understanding of the paradox very 
desirable. Therefore, the main goal was to offer a better and encompassing 
understanding of the dilemma. While I think I have been able to do so, some discussed 
aspects have raised new topics. Unfortunately, I have not been able to incorporate all of 
these in this thesis. For this section, I chose the ones that I think are most relevant for 
contemporary (Western) societies. 
      Shue (2009) points out that one cannot morally evaluate a particular action without 
knowing exactly what it is and what it entails (Shue 2009, 314). In the case of torture, 
this is illustrated by the argument made in the beginning of this research that effective 
torture needs social institutionalization. “To think that one can make wise moral 
assessments of practices without knowing how the practices work – indeed, without 
really knowing what the practices are, is intellectually and morally irresponsible” (ibid). 
Instead of writing about the notion of dirty hands in relation to hypothetical dilemmas 
(as most scholars do), Shue calls for a better link between theoretical considerations and 
actual dilemmas of dirty hands in reality. When accepting a framework less extreme 
than Walzer’s supreme emergency (as this thesis does), it could be interesting to analyze 
the paradox of dirty hands in more detail in relation to a specific case. 
      Also, because this thesis has shown that the dilemma of dirty hands occurs within 
morality, it has focused on the conditions that can justify getting dirty hands within this 
perspective. However, it could prove very useful to compare these conditions with the 
conditions that supporters of the amoral perspective have formulated. The question 
whether, and to what extent, these would be different creates probably an even better 
understanding of the different perspectives. 
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